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War and the Farmer 
0. B. JESNESS 
WHEN WAR broke out in Europe in the late summer of 1939, the expectations of its effects on conditions in 
this country were colored by recollections of the situation 
during the first world war. Thoughts went back to high 
prices and scarcity-to sugar rationing, meatless days, and 
barley bread. Many consumers rushed to lay in supplies, 
and prices rose temporarily. However, the sobering realiza-
tion that there was no immediate threat of shortage soon 
gained the upper hand and prices sagged. 
The fact is that prices for products generally did not ad-
vance suddenly at the outbreak of World War I. Instead, 
many prices weakened. The war had been underway about 
two years before prices rose materially, and much of the rise 
did not occur until after the United States entered the con-
flict in 1917. Hence, the experiences of the earlier war 
period did not support the expectations of a price boom at 
the outbreak of the present conflict. A question may well 
be raised here as to how the situation in the two periods 
compare or differ. 
Production, supply of 
farm goods greater 
now than in 1914. 
Production and supplies of 
major agricultural products 
were considerably greater at the 
outbreak of this war than they 
were in 1914. The first world war broke out in a period 
in which there was considerable concern over living costs 
and future food supply. The present war found a world 
troubled with agricultural surpluses and low prices. Dur-
ing the years since the first world war, some of the European 
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countries had made strenuous efforts to meet their own agri-
cultural needs. Available shipping space also was greater 
in 1939 than in 1914, lessening the premium on nearby 
sources such as the United States by making accessible sup-
plies from more distant regions. 
The international credit situation is another point of dif-
ference. In 1914, this country was a debtor nation as a result 
of loans and capital investments made here by other coun-
tries. The large purchases made by European nations during 
the war offset the amounts we owed abroad, and the credits 
they arranged for purchases in the United States changed 
our status to that of a creditor nation. However, this coun-
try did not see its way clear to adopt trade policies, especially 
a lower tariff, which would permit payment of these debts 
in goods and ~ervices so they have remained largely un-
paid. This situation was a factor in the enactment of the 
Johnson Act restricting extension of credit to foreign nations 
in debt to us. 
Britain needs war 
supplies more than 
our farm products. 
When the present war started 
the Allies were not without 
means of making purchases here, 
but they preferred to conserve 
these resources mainly for essential war supplies such as 
airplanes and munitions not obtainable elsewhere and to 
buy many of their agricultural requirements from countries 
where exchange was more favorable and credit could be 
obtained. The defeat of France removed the buying power 
of that country from the American market, while Great 
Britain has continued to use its means mainly for nonagri-
cultural needs. 
During the early months of the war, actual conflict was 
limited. However, when it got underway in the spring of 
1940, it spread with amazing speed. The invasion of Den-
mark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France in 
rapid succession took these areas out of the market as far 
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as trade with the United States is concerned. The entry 
of Italy bottled up another part of Europe. 
The consequence has been that agricultural export out-
lets for the Americas have been greatly curtailed. The 
resulting situation is even more acute for some of the South 
American countries than for the United States because of 
their reliance on agriculture and their relatively greater 
dependence upon European markets. The agricultural ex-
ports of these countries to a considerable extent consist of 
the same kind of products as ours. They, therefore, tend to 
compete directly with our proi:f~~ts for the war-restricted 
European market. 
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WHAT OF the future? The answer to this question depends upon a variety of considerations. Among them 
are questions relating to how long the war will last and who 
will be the victor. Possibilities that the conflict may spread 
and that the United States may become involved need to 
be recognized. Our own defense preparations and the future 
situation as far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned 
also have important bearings on agricultural prospects. 
The war in Europe may end soon or it may become a 
long drawn out conflict. It may spread to new areas. It 
may leave one side or the other in a dominant position, or 
it may end in a stalemate. If the end should come soon, it 
is not apparent that there would be any great stimulus to 
agricultural exports from the United States on that account. 
Evidently, there is considerable need for increased food 
supplies for European populations during the next few 
months. An end to the war might provide a place for some 
of our accumulated surpluses. A limiting factor is that of 
purchasing power. The disruptions and costs of war will 
lessen rather than increase Europe's ability to buy so that 
regardless of its outcome, the European market in the post-
war period will tend to be reduced rather than enlarged. 
Uncertainty looms as 
to war's effect on our 
farm goods market. 
If the war continues over a 
period of time, it is reasonable 
to expect that countries at war 
will need to draw more heavily 
on outside sources for their maintenance. The effective-
ness of blockades and destruction of shipping enters this 
picture. In the case of the latter, the question may be 
one of availability of armed ships to serve as convoys as 
much as or more than the availability of merchant ships. A 
situation might arise in which shipping limitations would 
increase the advantage of nearness of supply as happened 
during World War I. Should such a situation develop there 
might be increased demand for farm products from Canada 
and the United States for the period of the war. 
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An important question for the American farmer is, "What 
sort of world has the future in store?" If Germany and 
Italy win the war, will they be able to maintain and extend 
to the rest of Europe the totalitarian form of government? 
If so, will the trade relations of Europe with the outside 
world be carried on as barter under strongly centralized 
control? Will Japan succeed in establishing control over 
the Far East and dominate trade in that area? 
The intent of the dictators can only be guessed at by 
their past performances which are none too reassuring. 
However, victory for them in the present war does not neces-
sarily mean that they will be left strong enough to enable 
them to carry out their plans in full. There are a number 
of unknowns, and nothing is to be gained by giving too 
positive answers to questions such as those raised above. 
However, they involve matters to which American farm 
people need to give careful thought. 
If all of Europe should come under the sway of dictator-
ship, it is reasonable to assume that every effort would be 
made by that control to plan and coordinate European 
productive efforts in such a way as to increase its self re-
liance. However, European people would still require 
products from other parts of the world so that there would 
remain need for an exchange. The doubt centers on the 
methods likely to be employed in carrying on such trading. 
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CONCERN has been shown over the importance of pro-tecting the western hemisphere against invasion in the 
event of a totalitarian victory in Europe. Much of the 
popular thinking has related to the prospects for military 
aggression. Less attention has been given to the probability 
that a dictator-controlled Europe might employ trade rather 
than armed attack as the means of poEtical penetration. 
Many countries of the Americas are dependent to an im-
portant degree on European outlets. Totalitarian control 
over trade may seek to gain political domination through 
its offer of markets and supplies. Such control may offer 
attractive deals in order to attain its ends. 
The United States has served notice on other nations 
that any attack on the American continent will be a viola-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine. This is designed primarily 
to resist the efforts of any outside nations to obtain a foot-
hold in the Western Hemisphere through the use of force. 
It will not apply so effectively to the method which may be 
tried, namely that of gaining political control through the 
leverage of trade. ·Some countries in the Western Hemi-
sphere may become so desirous of obtaining outlets for 
their products that they may accept modifications in their 
governmental organization or policies in order to gain trade 
opportunities. 
Can we replace Eu-
rope's market for So. 
American goods? 
The suggestion that the 
United States might step in and 
replace Europe as an outlet for 
agricultural exports from other 
countries in the Western Hemisphere encounters the dif-
ficulty that we either are the principal buyer already or 
else that the products compete with lines in which we have 
surpluses. We are the principal customer for Brazil's cof-
fee. We do not need Brazil's cotton or Argentina's wheat. 
We have large supplies of both products on hand. We are 
not in the market for corn. We are taking about all of the 
flaxseed, hides, and meats we can without displacing our 
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own products. The fact that the United States competes 
with products from other American nations in the world 
markets needs to be kept in mind in developing our own 
export programs. Subsidizing exports of corn, cotton, and 
wheat from the United States may add to the difficulties 
of these countries and consequently make it harder for them 
to resist the pressure from dictator nations. 
Some insist that American industry produces so efficiently 
that it can reasonably expect to hold its own in competition 
in international markets in products for which it has advan-
tages. However, we can hold such advantages only as long 
as our costs are held in line and trade is on a reasonably 
competitive basis. Totalitarian barter may largely dis-
regard costs in some of its dealings and thereby create con-
ditions which can not be met by normal trade operations. 
This is possible for a government which controls the eco-
nomic activities of its subjects. It creates problems which 
can not be solved merely by ignoring them. 
War and conquest may change the ownership or con-
trol of resources. However, their location remains, and 
the need for trade continues. The desirable goal to strive 
for is that of a world carrying on its interchanges with the 
fewest possible interferences, controls, and restrictions. It 
may be granted that the attainment of such a goal is not a 
promise of the near future. The prospects instead are that 
export markets for farm products may remain subject to 
considerable control. This, however, is no reason why the 
desirability of greater freedom of trade should be ignored 
and why efforts to reach it should not be continued. 
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NOT ALL of the war developments affecting agriculture are in other countries. The program to provide ade-
quate defenses for the United States bears promise of far 
reaching effects on our domestic situation. The building of 
warships and the manufacture of airplanes, tanks, and other 
supplies for defense call for vast expenditures and the use 
of labor and resources which, for the time being at least, 
will add to employment, payrolls, and the national income 
as measured in dollars. The results will have stimulating 
effects on the domestic market for farm products. 
Problems of agriculture are not separate and distinct 
from economic problems generally. Low prices, unsatis-
factory markets, and the piling up of agricultural surpluses 
are closely related to unemployment, unused plants, and 
lack of production in nonagricultural lines. The importance 
of agricultural prosperity to prosperity generally has been 
stressed repeatedly. The importance of business activity 
and full employment to agricultural welfare is probably 
even greater. 
Greater production in 
industry, not farming 
needed for recovery. 
Much has been said about 
giving the farmer "a fair share 
of the national income." This 
implies that the difficulties of 
agriculture are caused by too large a share of the national 
income going to someone else. Granting that the present 
distribution of income may fall far short of perfection, it 
still remains that a major depression problem is that of 
increasing the national income through increased produc-
tion. To use a homely illustration, what is needed is not 
merely a different way of cutting the pie. A larger pie is 
necessary before satisfactory incomes will be available gen-
erally. The only way to get that larger pie is by produc-
tion-not blind production without regard to the market's 
ability to absorb, but well-balanced production. Or to con-
tinue the pie illustration, the ingredients must be in proper 
proportions. 
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Agricultural production, unlike industrial production, 
continues in spite of depressed markets, and there is no need 
in sight for its expansion. The greater production to in-
crease national income must come from other lines. Fuller 
employment and a larger income for consumers of farm 
products will enable them to buy more or pay a higher price 
for the amounts purchased. If sufficient expansion in non-
agricultural employment takes place, outlets will be pro-
vided for some of the farm population not needed in 
agricultural production. 
Defense plans stimu-
late domestic demand 
for farm products. 
Defense preparations are stim-
ulating activity in nonagricul-
turallines. Improvements in the 
domestic demand for some farm 
products already have resulted. As defense expenditures 
are expected to remain important for several years, this 
factor will influence outlets for farm products for some time. 
Too much, however, should not be expected from this. 
Demand for farm products is not unlimited. The products 
for which demand is relatively elastic may expect to feel 
the greatest effects. Losses of foreign markets for cotton, 
wheat, lard, tobacco, some fruits, and other farm products 
will not be offset by gains in domestic consumption. Unless 
foreign markets recover, a serious agricultural surplus prob-
lem will remain until the agricultural industry can be shrunk 
to fit the smaller demand. 
What are the prospects that war preparations may lead to 
drastic price increases? If the demands for defense were 
placed on industry already producing at capacity and with 
little or no unemployment, the effects of the program on 
price would be very marked. That is not the situation today. 
Unemployed workers, unused plant capacity, and available 
capital mean that a considerable increase in production may 
take place without skyrocketing prices. This fact needs to 
be kept in mind in trying to forecast effects. 
In mentioning unused resources, however, it should be 
pointed out that their existence does not mean that short-
ages may not arise. Men and plants are not standardized 
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so that they are available for every type of production. The 
defense program calls for workers of certain skills. Plants 
for particular kinds of manufacture are needed. Shortages 
of skilled workers in some lines may develop while millions 
are still unemployed. Much of the unused plant capacity 
is not of the right kind or in the right places to serve de-
fense needs. Plant expansion, therefore, is an important 
part of defense activities. Because of these situations, prices 
in some lines may rise more quickly than the price level in 
general. 
While the defense program will tend to stimulate busi-
ness activity, decrease unemployment, and improve dom:::s-
tic outlets for farm products it will not serve as a permanent 
substitute for production to satisfy more normal require-
ments. Expenditures for this purpose are not likely to con-
tinue indefinitely. Moreover, the problem of financing them 
can not be overlooked. For the time being they may be met 
largely by borrowing. However, public debt can not be 
increased indefinitely without danger. The amount of addi-
tional borrowing which can take place is reduced by the fact 
that large debts have been created in efforts to alleviate 
depression conditions. 
Defense expenditures 
will necessitate steep 
increase in taxes. 
Some increase in federal taxes 
to meet defense expenditures 
has already taken place. A steep 
increas2 in tax payments will 
be in order for years to come. The increased money in-
comes resulting from the defense activities will make avail-
able more taxpaying ability. The amounts taken by taxes, 
however, will reduce correspondingly that available for pur-
chases by the taxpayers. Those who think that the large 
amounts required to finance the defense program can be 
obtained by taxes falling exclusively on those of high in-
comes are deluding themselves. The burden is of such 
magnitude that it will have to be shared, directly or in-
directly, by everyone. 
While the national income is most conveniently stated in 
terms of dollars, the real income of the people is the goods 
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and services which satisfy wants. Resources used for ships, 
tanks, planes, guns, and support of men in military service 
are not also available for satisfying other wants. Large 
numbers of men can not be called from peacetime pursuits 
for service in the army or navy without disruptive effects. 
The stimulus supplied by huge defense expenditures may 
lead to the mistaken notion that this is an easy and costless 
way of recovery. The availability of unused manpower and 
resources means that there need be no immediate reduction 
in living standards. War and preparation for war, however, 
are destructive rather than constructive. Needs are likely 
to become so great that they will absorb such a share of the 
national income that in time they will reduce living stand-
ards of the mass of the people. 
In the long run de-
fense work may ag-
gravatefarm problem. 
It is unlikely that defense 
preparations will continue in-
definitely on the present scale. 
To the extent they are tempo-
rary they will tend to unbalance production. Some of 
the man power will not be needed permanently and un-
less an expansion of peacetime production should coincide 
with the tapering off in defense, unemployment will result. 
Capital will be found to have been invested in plants and 
equipment not needed to full capacity for permanent use. 
Defense depends upon a flow of public funds, and as tapering 
off in expenditures takes place, there will be a tendency to 
a return of depression conditions. In short, while expendi-
tures for defense may temporarily lessen agricultural and 
other problems, the long run effect will be to aggravate 
rather than to remedy them. The stimulating effects of war 
activities should not be confused with those of real recovery 
coming from production for a fuller satisfaction of more 
normal peacetime wants. This is not an argument against 
taking care of defense needs. It is, instead, a suggestion 
that it be recognized that these needs call for work and sac-
rifice on the part of the people. 
While a price boom is not in prospect at present, a lengthy 
war and extensive defense preparation in time might pro-
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duce conditions favorable to such a result. In the event that 
this occurs there are certain lessons of earlier experiences 
well worth keeping in mind. The price boom of the former 
war led to an agricultural expansion which has continued to 
affect the surplus situation over the past two decades. If 
war prices for farm products should be repeated, the urge 
to expand land in farms and to increase the number of 
farmers should be resisted. Such an expansion of farm pro-
duction will only make worse the depression which is sure 
to follow after war demands are cut off. 
Land value depends 
on long-run earnings, 
not on boom prices. 
One of the most serious price 
effects of the last war was the 
speculative land boom. Average 
farm land prices in Minnesota 
during the peak of the war boom were more than double 
those of the years immediately preceding the war. Farm 
land declined sharply in the early twenties and again in 
the early thirties so that land values average lower today 
than before the first world war. The buyer of a farm 
acquires the right to the future incomes from it, and that 
farm is only worth those incomes reduced to present value. 
That is, the value of land is determined not by boom prices 
but by its earnings over a long period of time. Every pur-
chaser of a farm should bear this in mind. 
The rise in land prices during the late war was particu-
larly disastrous because of the large farm debt it left in its 
wake. The estimated total farm mortgage debt in the United 
States in 1910 was a little over 3 billion dollars. By 1920, it 
had more than doubled, being nearly 8% billions. While 
prices broke in 1920, farm mortgage debt continued to rise 
after that, reaching a peak of over 10% billion dollars in 
1923. It is still about 7 billion dollars, or more than double 
that of thirty years ago. While land prices have dropped to 
levels more nearly in line with prices of farm products, many 
farmers still are struggling under a heavy debt. The lesson 
this teaches is clear. Long-term debts should not be con-
tracted on the basis of boom prices. They should be kept in 
line with long-term prospects for ability to pay. 
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If a rise in prices occurs, it will be a good time to pay off 
some of the existing debt rather than to take on more. 
Farmers who pay off debt when prices are high are doing it 
with dollars of low purchasing power. Those who borrow 
at such times get such dollars and will have to pay back in 
dollars of higher purchasing power later when prices fall. 
War booms tend to 
increase the taxes on 
farm lands. 
High prices and rising land 
values during the war period 
increased decidedly th~ taxes 
paid by owners of farm real 
estate. Taxes have come down much less than farm prices 
and land values so that the tax burden has remained rela-
tively greater than it was before the first world war. An-
other war boom in prices will tend to increase taxes on 
general property. Local units of government which depend 
primarily on funds from the general property tax should 
avoid embarking on programs which anticipate the con-
tinuance of boom prices. 
In short, while war or preparation for defense may stimu-
late the demand for farm products, particularly in the do-
mestic market, they represent no permanent solution to 
farm problems. 
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